As-Applied Commerce Clause Challenges by Tseytlin, Misha
 
479 
AS-APPLIED COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES 
Misha Tseytlin* 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Con-
gress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.”1  For sixty years following the New Deal, the Supreme 
Court took a hands-off approach in assessing Congress’s assertions of 
Commerce Clause authority, going so far as to treat the boundaries of 
that authority as a political question.2  In the last twenty years, howev-
er, the Court showed a renewed interest in enforcing limitations on 
Congress’s assertions of authority under this provision, from its 
landmark decisions invalidating congressional enactments in United 
States v. Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison4 to its underrated decisions 
limiting the reach of statutes on Commerce Clause grounds in Jones v. 
United States5 and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),6 to the Commerce Clause 
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).7  
At the same time, the Court’s engagement in this area has been 
marked by caution.  Lopez and Morrison involved narrow, single-issue 
statutes or provisions.8  Jones and SWANCC relied upon the Commerce 
Clause and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance merely to narrow 
broad statutes.9  And, NFIB combined the Commerce Clause deter-
mination with the same avoidance doctrine to justify upholding the 
Affordable Care Act as a tax.10 
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 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 2 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). 
 3 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 4 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 5 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
 6 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 7 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 8 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.  
 9 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162; Jones, 529 U.S. at 850–51. 
 10 132 S. Ct. at 2578–80. 
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Just as the Court has taken the most careful, preliminary steps to-
ward enforcing limitations on the outer boundaries of Congress’s au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, some commentators and judg-
es—many of whom are sympathetic to the merits of some judicial 
limitations on congressional authority—have argued that the Court 
must act broadly, or not at all.11  The most prominent and cogent ar-
ticulation of this viewpoint comes from Professor Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, whose seminal, brilliant work in The Subjects of the Consti-
tution12 and The Objects of the Constitution13 inspired this Symposium.  
Rosenkranz argues that because the Commerce Clause is directed at 
Congress (“Congress shall have the power to . . .”14) any challenge to 
congressional action under that Clause must be “facial.”15  Specifical-
ly, he claims that because the subject of the Commerce Clause is Con-
gress, a decision as to whether Congress exceeded its Commerce 
Clause authority in enacting a statute—and thus, violated the Tenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against usurping authority “reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people”16—must be adjudicated as an all-
or-nothing proposition.17  Professor Rosenkranz’s theory is unques-
tionably creative constitutional interpretation of the highest caliber.  
At the same time, if accepted, it would mean that a court facing an 
argument that Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause authority 
must either invalidate the entire statute or uphold the entire statute. 
This Article seeks to refute Rosenkranz’s argument that courts 
should limit their adjudication of challenges to Congress’s assertions 
of Commerce Clause authority to those attacking the entire statutory 
provision.  Part I provides a primer on as-applied and facial challeng-
es, explaining that the claim that a challenge under a constitutional 
provision must be “facial” is—in practical reality—an argument that a 
statute is always constitutional in all of its possible applications or un-
constitutional in all of its applications, with no middle ground possi-
ble.  Part II explains the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  Part III argues that—contrary to Rosenkranz’s view—
 
 11 See, e.g., Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge “On Its Face”:  Why 
Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 164 
(2004) (discussing the choice faced by the judiciary to adopt either the as-applied test or 
the facial test when analyzing laws challenged under the Commerce Clause (citing United 
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting))). 
 12 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
 13 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 15 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1236. 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 17 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1248. 
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the Constitution’s structure does not require that all Commerce 
Clause challenges must be facial; indeed, that structure suggests the 
opposite.  This Part also argues that Rosenkranz’s facial-only ap-
proach would lead to outcomes inconsistent with the meaning of the 
Commerce Clause and would undermine the Supreme Court’s nas-
cent project to enforce the limitations on that Clause.  Finally, Part IV 
suggests two as-applied decision rules under modern Supreme Court 
doctrine, which can serve as a starting point to reinvigorate as-applied 
adjudication in this area. 
I.  PRIMER ON FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 
To evaluate Professor Rosenkranz’s argument that all Commerce 
Clause challenges must be “facial,” as opposed to “as-applied,” it is es-
sential to understand with some precision what these terms mean.  In 
a recent article in the Virginia Law Review, Scott A. Keller and I en-
deavored to define those terms by reference to the practice of 
courts.18 
First, some basics.  Courts do not simply look at a constitutional 
phrase like “[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States,”19 compare it to the statute that 
Congress enacted, and thus decide the question of whether the stat-
ute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.  Judi-
cial review is often a complicated task, which requires the court to 
consider factors such as mandates of the text, how those mandates 
compare to the statute Congress enacted, how courts in the future 
should determine whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional 
authority, and the institutional limitations of the judicial branch.  Put 
another way, to determine whether Congress has exceeded its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause, courts need judicially enforceable 
tools to translate the Constitution’s phrases into doctrines that can be 
enforced across a broad range of complicated statutes and situa-
tions.20  These judicial tools are known as “decision rules.”21  To take 
 
 18 Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating 
Statutes In Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301 (2012).  
 19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 20 See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 320–21 (contending that the court has created a 
variety of constitutional decisional rules to “enforce the Constitution’s provisions and 
constrain lower courts as they adjudicate constitutional disputes”). 
 21 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decisional Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) 
(“[D]octrines that direct courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposi-
tion is satisfied [are] constitutional decisional rules.”  (internal quotations omitted)); Kel-
ler & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 318 (“The identification of constitutional defects is guid-
ed by what many scholars have identified as ‘constitutional decision rules.’”); Lawrence 
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the most relevant example for present purposes, the Supreme Court 
has created a series of decision rules in the Commerce Clause con-
text, including that a court will not invalidate a congressional action 
where it determines that there is a “rational basis” for concluding that 
the statute regulates “activities, taken in the aggregate, [that] substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.”22  Even this complex articulation of 
the Commerce Clause decision rule is an oversimplification, as Part II 
will discuss. 
Court-created decision rules rarely attempt to enforce the Consti-
tution’s requirements completely.  Instead, they incorporate the 
comparative institutional (in)competence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the 
politically accountable branches.  For example, deferential standards 
of review such as “rational basis,” by definition, acknowledge that the 
courts will not fully enforce a constitutional provision, out of due re-
spect for a co-equal branch.23  Acknowledging that many decision 
rules are not designed to fully enforce the Constitution does not 
mean that the courts can legitimately change the Constitution’s 
meaning; to the contrary, well-designed decision rules should derive 
from the Constitution’s actual meaning, while at the same time ac-
knowledging that the courts are just one of three co-equal federal ac-
tors charged with enforcing the Constitution. 
Some decision rules train the courts’ focus broadly on a statute as 
a whole, while others permit (or require) courts to look only at a 
small sliver of a statute’s application.  To take the simplest example, 
in the rare circumstances where the Supreme Court has adopted de-
cision rules that require courts to look to the motivation underlying a 
statute, these rules necessarily require evaluating the statute as a 
whole.24  One such decision rule is the so-called Lemon test, which asks 
whether the enactment was motivated by a desire to suppress reli-
gion.25  That decision rule necessarily applies to the statute at its root, 
 
Gene Sager, Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. 
L. REV. 1212, 1214–15 (1978) (“In applying provisions of the Constitution to the chal-
lenged behavior of state or federal officials, the federal courts have modeled analytical 
structures . . . .”). 
 22 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 23 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What the Court 
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1653 (2005) (observing that the Court, when applying rational-
basis review, defers to Congress’s constitutionality determinations in Commerce Clause 
legislation even if the determination is imperfect). 
 24 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1345 (2000) (“[S]ome constitutional tests identify defects in a stat-
ute’s historical origins or motivations that pervade all possible subrules through which 
the statute might be specified.”). 
 25 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
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as the congressional motivation to harm a particular religion is not 
amenable to a narrowed focus on a particular subclass of persons the 
statute covers.26  On the other end of the spectrum, a decision rule 
that requires a court to focus on the burden the statute places on any  
individual litigant—such as the undue-burden test in the Due Process 
Clause/abortion context27—is unlikely to train a court’s eye on the 
statute’s entire reach, as the amount of burden each person (or class 
of persons) will experience under the statute will almost necessarily 
vary.28 
So what of as-applied and facial challenges?  The Supreme Court 
has explained that “[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building 
blocks of constitutional adjudication.”29  Put another way, in the run-
of-the-mill constitutional challenge, a litigant brings a lawsuit (or is 
subject to a lawsuit or a criminal prosecution by the government) and 
then, invokes a constitutional provision to vindicate his or her rights.  
As the court adjudicates the case, the decision rule applicable to the 
constitutional provision will inform how broadly the court reasons.  
The breadth of that reasoning may, as a matter of precedent or per-
suasive authority, impact a significant number of other cases.  In this 
way, every case is an as-applied challenge. 
But that is three-quarters of the story.  The Supreme Court has 
held that, under some circumstances, a court should go beyond 
merely adjudicating a case as-applied to the particular facts of the 
case and declaring the rights of the parties before it, and should hold 
that the entire statute is unenforceable in toto.  To implement this 
remedial doctrine, the Court has designed what Scott Keller and I 
have labeled “invalidation rules.”30  By far, the most straightforward 
and commonly used invalidation rule is the Salerno doctrine, which 
derives its name from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Salerno.31  Under this doctrine, a court should only invalidate a statute 
in toto if “the challenger [can] establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the Act would be valid.”32  That is, a court should 
invalidate a statute in whole where the court’s application of the rele-
 
 26 Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 328–29. 
 27 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). 
 28 See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 360 (explaining that the “undue burden” test estab-
lished in Casey limited courts’ ability to invalidate abortion regulations in toto). 
 29 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (quoting Fallon, supra note 24, at 1328). 
 30 See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 325 (defining the term “invalidation rule” as a judi-
cially created rule for determining a remedy after a constitutional violation has been 
found). 
 31 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 32 Id. at 745. 
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vant decision rules makes clear that any challenge to the statute 
would succeed, in every application.33  The Salerno invalidation rule 
rests on a commonsense proposition:  if the court applying the rele-
vant decision rule can readily determine that the statute has no con-
stitutional application, then it should so hold, informing citizens and 
public officials that the statute, as a whole, is unenforceable.  The Sa-
lerno invalidation rule, while it may seem exceedingly difficult to satis-
fy due to its categorical nature, is actually used fairly commonly, as 
courts’ reasoning under decision rules often covers the reach of the 
entire statute.34 
Given that as-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of 
constitutional adjudication and that “facial” challenges are the prod-
uct of invalidation rules superimposed upon such as-applied chal-
lenges, it is fair to ask whether the argument that a particular consti-
tutional provision permits only facial adjudication is coherent at all.  
There is, however, a way to reframe the question to be fair to Profes-
sor Rosenkranz’s argument that Commerce Clause challenges must 
be adjudicated facially.  The Salerno doctrine provides that where a 
particular decision rule adheres in all of a statute’s possible applica-
tions, the statute must be invalidated in toto; accordingly, if successful 
adjudication under a particular decision rule will always satisfy Saler-
no, one can confidently conclude that adjudication under that deci-
sion rule is exclusively “facial.”  For example, if the Lemon test was the 
only decision rule in the Establishment Clause context, then all adju-
dication under the Clause would be “facial.”  When Professor 
Rosenkranz claims that all challenges under the Commerce Clause 
must be “facial,” what he is saying, as a practical, real-world matter, is 
that court adjudication of congressional enactment of statutes under 
that Clause must always either lead to wholesale affirmance of the en-
actment or in toto invalidation; it must be an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion.  The court is not allowed to say:  “Congress violated the Consti-
tution by attempting to prohibit the relevant conduct at issue in this 
particular case under its Commerce Clause power, and we need not 
make any further comment.”35 
 
 33 Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 326. 
 34 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
915 (2011) (finding that use of facial challenges like the Salerno invalidation rule to chal-
lenge the validity of statutes is much more common than the conventional wisdom as-
sumes); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:  Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Re-
quirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1998) (arguing that the Salerno invalidation rule is not as 
stringent as it is perceived). 
 35 Notably, the Salerno invalidation rule is not the only invalidation rule that the Court has 
adopted.  In the Free Speech Clause context, the Court has created the “overbreadth” 
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II.  THE MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE CASE LAW 
After sixty years of a hands-off approach to the Commerce Clause, 
the Supreme Court began to re-engage in United States v. Lopez and 
United States v. Morrison, by invalidating in toto a provision prohibiting 
anyone from possessing a firearm in a school zone and a federal 
cause of action for gender-motivated violence.  In those cases, the 
Court went beyond as-applied adjudication—which would have in-
volved merely holding that the defendant in Lopez could not be pros-
ecuted and the defendant in Morrison could not be subject to a civil 
action—and discussed its justification for “invalidat[ing]” both stat-
utes.36  
 Lopez and Morrison announced a series of Commerce Clause deci-
sion rules, which courts could use to determine whether Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in future cases.  
Under these rules, in order to decide whether the Commerce Clause 
authorized Congress’s actions, a court has to determine whether the 
statute regulates (1) “the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons 
or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.”37  Lopez and Morrison dealt with 
this last, most controversial category by announcing a further-refined 
decision rule which required a court to decide whether Congress had 
a “rational basis” for concluding that the regulated activity, taken in 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.38  And, in deter-
mining whether Congress satisfied this “substantive affects” test, the 
Court emphasized the importance of the activity being “economic,”39 
 
doctrine, which permits a court to declare a statute void in toto based upon a finding that 
a statue is unconstitutional in a substantial number of its applications, compared to the 
statute’s constitutional reach.  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Keller & 
Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 348.  The possibility of an alternative invalidation rule does not 
seem, however, to have any relevance to a claim that adjudication under a particular deci-
sion rule must always be facial.  This is because the very concept of overbreadth invalida-
tion presupposes that there can be a number of successful as-applied challenges to a stat-
ute but not a sufficient number to satisfy the overbreadth standard.  Put another way, the 
relevance of the overbreadth invalidation rule is directly tied to the existence of as-
applied decision rules. 
 36 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 
(1995).  This Article will later address whether the Court acted properly and coherently 
in invoking the Salerno invalidation rule for these statutes.  See infra pp. 490, 493. 
 37 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09 (internal citations omitted); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
 38 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612–13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–58. 
 39 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense 
of the phrase, economic activity.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“Section 922(q) is a criminal 
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adding that “[w]hile we need not adopt a categorical rule against ag-
gregating the effects of any noneconomic activity . . . thus far in our 
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation 
of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”40 
The Court has also invoked the limitations of the Commerce 
Clause to narrow congressional enactments under the cannon of 
constitutional avoidance.  In Jones v. United States,41 a unanimous Su-
preme Court creatively constricted the federal arson statute—which 
made it a crime to destroy “by means of fire or an explosive, 
any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any ac-
tivity affecting interstate or foreign commerce”—to apply only to the 
burning of commercial buildings.42  The Court justified this interpre-
tation by reliance on Lopez’s limitations on the Commerce Clause au-
thority, combined with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.43  
And, in SWANCC,44 the Court made clear that the doctrines an-
nounced in Lopez and Morrison went beyond federalizing local crimi-
nal law.  In SWANCC, the Court held that the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) coverage of “waters of the United States” did not encompass 
land containing permanent and seasonal ponds.  In explaining its 
narrow reading of the CWA, which was contrary to the interpretation 
of the CWA adopted by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Court not-
ed that a broader reading of the statute would “push the limit of con-
gressional authority” by forcing the Court to determine whether the 
regulation fell within “Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activities 
that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”45  Addressing this 
question would force the Court “to evaluate the precise object or ac-
tivity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
merce.”46 
The Supreme Court’s next adjudication under Commerce Clause 
decision rules came in Gonzales v. Raich.47  There, the Court consid-
ered whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”), as applied to “the intrastate manufacture 
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to Cali-
 
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic en-
terprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”). 
 40 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added). 
 41 529 U.S. 848 (2000). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006); Jones, 529 U.S. at 859. 
 43 Jones, 529 U.S at 857–58. 
 44 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 45 Id. at 173. 
 46 Id. 
 47 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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fornia law.”48  The Court explained that the petitioners had conceded 
that the entire category of activities that the CSA covered had, in the 
aggregate, “substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce.”49  Address-
ing the plaintiffs’ narrower argument that their activities could not 
constitutionally be swept into this “concededly valid” regime,50 the 
Court quoted its earlier pronouncement—repeated in Lopez—that 
when “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to 
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising 
under that statute is of no consequence,”51 adding that “[w]here the 
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of fed-
eral power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances’ of the class.”52  The Court explained that it was “appropri-
ate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA 
[because of] the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate 
market will draw such marijuana into that market,” adding that Con-
gress had a “rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the in-
trastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gap-
ing hole in the CSA.”53  And, in responding to the argument that the 
plaintiffs’ activities could not be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause because they are non-economic, the Court explained that 
“[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated 
by the CSA are quintessentially economic.  ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”54 
The Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on the scope of con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause came in NFIB,55 
where five Justices wrote or joined opinions concluding that requir-
ing people to buy health insurance exceeded Congress’s authority 
under Lopez’s “substantially affects interstate commerce” decision 
rule.  These opinions explained that a person’s decision not to en-
gage in an activity, such as purchasing insurance, was not the sort of 
“economic activity” that could be aggregated under the third Lopez 
prong.56  Then, the Chief Justice, using a variant of the approach in 
 
 48 Id. at 15. 
 49 Id. at 22. 
 50 Id. at 23. 
 51 Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 52 Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)). 
 53 Id. at 19, 22. 
 54 Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 720 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 3d ed. 1966)). 
 55 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 56 Id. at 2587, 2647–48.  
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SWANCC, read the statute to avoid this constitutional problem by 
concluding that the individual mandate could be recast as a tax, even 
though he concluded that this was not the most “natural[]” reading 
of the provision.57 
III.  IN DEFENSE OF AS-APPLIED COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES 
The Court’s recent decision in NFIB illustrates that post-Raich re-
ports of the death of the Lopez/Morrison Commerce Clause revival58 
were greatly exaggerated.  Instead, the Supreme Court doctrine in 
this area remains in a state of flux.  The Court is seeking—indeed, 
grasping—to create decision rules that provide meaningful limita-
tions on Congress’s authority under the Commerce Cause, while at 
the same time showing understandable trepidation about invalidating 
broad laws such as the Affordable Care Act, the CWA, and the CSA.  
In the face of this uncertainty, Rosenkranz has provided a powerful 
voice in favor of the Court deciding Commerce Clause cases broadly 
or not at all.  This Part aims to show that limiting Commerce Clause 
adjudication in the manner that Rosenkranz urges is not required by 
the constitutional text (indeed, arguably it is contrary to that text in 
most cases), would lead to results inconsistent with the Commerce 
Clause’s mandates, and would stunt the Supreme Court’s fragile pro-
ject to enforce some limitations on Congress’s Commerce Clause au-
thority. 
Rosenkranz’s primary argument is that the structure of the Com-
merce Clause requires only facial challenges.59  Under Rosenkranz’s 
logic, because the subject of the Commerce Clause is Congress, any 
challenge to Congress’s authority under that Clause must be facial, 
since Congress must be the constitutional culprit in any assertion that 
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority.  As Rosenkranz 
explains, “[i]f Congress violated the Constitution by making a law, 
basic remedial principles suggest that the Court should accord the vi-
olation no legal effect and should instead restore the law to the pre-
violation status quo.”60 
 
 57 Id. at 2594–601. 
 58 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?  Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005) (arguing for the death of Morrison and evolution to-
wards broader reaching federal laws).  But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana 
Case:  A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879 (2005) (arguing 
that declarations of Morrison’s death are exaggerated). 
 59 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1275. 
 60 Id. at 1248. 
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Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis correctly identifies that only Con-
gress can exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  But, this 
insight does not suggest that in toto invalidation is a mandatory rem-
edy for such an overreach.  Recall, for example, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in SWANCC.61  If Congress had specifically defined “waters of 
the United States” in the CWA as including seasonal ponds—and, as-
suming, arguendo, that reaching some such ponds is beyond Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause authority—it would have been wholly con-
sistent with the Commerce Clause’s structure for the Court to 
invalidate the CWA only to the extent that it applied to those ponds.  
Put in Rosenkranz’s terms, while the “constitutional culprit”62 would 
be Congress, its “crime” would be enacting a statute that—in some 
small measure—exceeded its Commerce Clause authority.  Or, as 
Professor Gillian E. Metzger put it, “no logical reason exists why a liti-
gant could not . . . allege that part of a statutory provision is unconsti-
tutional or that a statute is unconstitutional in a particular range of 
applications, even if not unconstitutional in all or most.”63 
A deeper look at Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis of the Constitu-
tion actually supports the conclusion that in toto is rarely appropriate 
in the Commerce Clause context.  As Rosenkranz points out, Con-
gress cannot actually violate the Commerce Clause; rather, it can only 
violate the Tenth Amendment when it makes a law that exceeds its 
authority under the enumerated powers.64  But, consider what could 
justify a court in invoking the Salerno invalidation rule to begin with.  
In the case of an external limitation on congressional authority—
such, for example, as the Establishment Clause—the justification for 
in toto invalidation is straightforward:  if, under the relevant decision 
rule, the statute violates the Establishment Clause in all of its applica-
tions, Salerno invalidation of the statute must follow.  Or, put more 
simply, if Congress has enacted a statute that establishes a religion, 
Congress’s actions are wholly invalid.  But, since Congress cannot ac-
tually violate the Commerce Clause, the only basis upon which Salerno 
invalidation would be appropriate is if the court looked at the statute, 
under every potentially relevant enumerated power, and then determined 
that the statute was categorically authorized by none of those powers 
in every instance.  That inquiry would seem to be an incredibly time-
consuming task and one which would force the court to violate the 
“the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should 
 
 61 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  
 62 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1277. 
 63 Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (2005). 
 64 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1287. 
490 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
[not] anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the ne-
cessity of deciding it.”65 
Take a concrete example:  in the earliest successful Commerce 
Clause challenge, United States v. Dewitt,66 the Supreme Court held 
that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to prohibit the 
selling of combustible illuminating oils, but did not invalidate the 
statute in toto.  Instead, the Court observed that the prohibition 
would continue to have effect where Congress had plenary legislative 
authority, “as for example, in the District of Columbia.”67  Dewitt’s re-
fusal to invalidate the statute in toto is wholly consistent with 
Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis that Congress cannot actually violate 
the Commerce Clause but merely violates the Tenth Amendment.  In 
a particular case, a court can conclude that Congress exceeded its 
Commerce Clause authority in enacting the statute and that, if the 
Commerce Clause was the only font of authority that the government 
invoked, the government should lose the case.  However, the Court 
need not definitively decide whether the same statute may be author-
ized by a different enumerated power in other instances not before 
the Court, such as within the District of Columbia, where the Consti-
tution authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever.”68 
This account calls into question whether the Court was correct in 
its in toto invalidation of the statutes in Lopez and Morrison.  After all, 
it is not clear that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority to 
the extent that it was prohibiting gun possession in the District of Co-
lumbia.  Perhaps the result more consistent with the Constitution’s 
text would have been for the Court to declare that the statute could 
not constitutionally be applied to Mr. Lopez (and, by logical implica-
tion, all others similarly situated), leaving for another day the ques-
tion of whether that statute was invalid in all of its applications. 
Rosenkranz’s remaining argument against as-applied Commerce 
Clause challenges is that “[i]f congressmen are to be accused of vio-
lating their oaths and Congress is to be accused of violating the Con-
stitution, the doctrinal test must be one that they could have applied 
when making the law,” meaning that “it must be that the violation is 
visible on the ‘face’ of the statute.”69  There are at least two flaws in 
 
 65 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 66 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869). 
 67 Id. at 45. 
 68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 69 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1278–79. 
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this argument.  First, it is possible—indeed, far from difficult—to de-
sign decision rules that could be applied by a “conscientious con-
gressman” at the time of enactment, which nevertheless would not 
require the entire statute be invalided in toto.  In Part IV, for exam-
ple, this Article argues that Supreme Court doctrine suggests an as-
applied decision rule that would permit a court to invalidate a por-
tion of a statute that applied to intrastate noneconomic conduct—or 
non-conduct—even if the rest of the statute applies to economic 
conduct that, taken in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce.70  A congressman deciding whether to vote in favor 
of a statute could make this inquiry in the same manner as a court 
would and vote against a law that regulates—even in small part—
some intrastate noneconomic activity.  Second, there is no textual ba-
sis for Rosenkranz’s intuition that legislators would be more offended 
by broader adjudication, which invalidates their entire handiwork.  
To the contrary, one could plausibly argue that a healthy respect for a 
co-equal branch would suggest that the Court should not, at a very 
minimum, create decision rules that require it to decide each Com-
merce Clause case as broadly as possible.  Rather, it should design 
rules that permit courts to narrow congressional enactments to avoid 
constitutional problems, where possible, and to invalidate narrow 
slivers of statutes, where avoidance is not possible.  That mode is con-
sistent with the principle that a court should seek to avoid 
“formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required 
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”71 
Rosenkranz’s approach to the Commerce Clause is also potentially 
harmful to the project of enforcing the limitations in the Commerce 
Clause.  If the Court were to adopt the principle that all adjudication 
under the Commerce Clause must be facial, this would narrow the 
Court’s ability to design decision rules that enforce the limitations on 
Commerce Clause authority consistent with text, precedent, and the 
comparative competence of courts.  To allow for facial-only adjudica-
tion of Commerce Clause cases, the Court would have to design deci-
sion rules that apply to every application of a statute and can never 
apply to less than the entire statute.72 
Designing a facial-only decision rule that would lead to adjudica-
tion that dutifully enforces the Commerce Clause’s limitations would 
be difficult; indeed, probably impossible.  Take, for example, 
 
 70 See infra pp. 495–96. 
 71 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 72 See supra pp. 482–83; see generally Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 328–29. 
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Rosenkranz’s suggested decision rule:  any statute that invokes Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause must have an “affects 
interstate commerce” hook in the text of the statute.73  This proposed 
rule is likely both overinclusive and underinclusive.  On one hand, no 
provision in the Constitution requires Congress to specifically state 
the invocation of that power on the face of legislation.  Thus, if courts 
were to apply Rosenkranz’s suggested decision rule with fidelity, then 
they would invalidate numerous statutes based not upon an analysis 
of the Commerce Clause’s text and history, but upon Congress’s fail-
ure to follow a court-created rule.  On the other hand, Rosenkranz’s 
proposed rule may overlook actions that exceed Congress’s Com-
merce Clause authority.  For instance, the anticommandeering doc-
trine is based upon the understanding that the Commerce Clause 
does not authorize Congress to force state officials to enforce federal 
law.74  It is at least arguable that Congress could not force state offi-
cials to do Congress’s bidding, even if the Government could prove 
that failure to abide by such a mandate would “affect interstate com-
merce.” 
Of course, one could imagine any number of Commerce Clause 
decision rules that apply to the entire statute as a whole; or, one 
could add the anticommandeering decision rule as an additional rule 
to Rosenkranz’s proposed rule.  But, the point is that whatever facial-
only decision rule—or series of rules—scholars and courts envision, 
those rules will likely suffer one of two problems and sometimes both.  
The rules will either be overbroad, such that it will require the courts 
to invalidate wholesale broad congressional enactments, where Con-
gress’s transgression is relatively minor compared to the scope of the 
law.  Or they would permit Congress to exceed its authority under the 
Commerce Clause by hiding otherwise unconstitutional assertions of 
authority in broad statutes.  These problems are acute because the art 
of modern legislation is a complex endeavor, especially in the field of 
the flow of goods among the states.  It is difficult to envision that any-
one could design facial-only decision rules that would apply across 
every application of every possible statute that implicates the Com-
merce Clause and which would yield results consistent with the Con-
stitution, under any interpretative theory. 
In sharp contrast to the facial-only approach, permitting the 
Court to design narrower decision rules, which would encourage as-
 
 73 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1281. 
 74 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (invalidating the take title 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on these 
grounds). 
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applied adjudication, would give courts the flexibility to tailor the 
cure to the constitutional malady.  A court confined to a facial-only 
approach to the Commerce Clause has, in effect, only two options:  
either uphold the statute in its entirety or declare that Congress has 
violated the Constitution and then, strike down the statute in toto by 
applying the Salerno invalidation rule.  Such a limitation could be dis-
astrous to the development of the law in this area.  The impetus for 
Lopez, Morrison, and the general modern thrust of the Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine is to find some limitations to 
Congress’s authority consistent with the “non-infinity principle.”75  
Put another way, the Constitution created a government of limited, 
enumerated powers, which presupposes a quantum of authority not 
delegated to Congress.  At the same time, as Michael E. Rosman—a 
proponent of Rosenkranz’s facial-only approach—admits, the Court 
is “unlikely to declare a . . . broad and all-encompassing [stat-
ute]. . . unconstitutional.”76  The Chief Justice’s struggle to find a way 
to uphold the Affordable Care Act in NFIB is a testament to that fact. 
In light of this reality, scholars and litigants should encourage the 
Court to strive to create narrower decision rules in the Commerce 
Clause, which would not call for in toto invalidation.  This would al-
low the Court to avoid the daunting all-or-nothing choice when fac-
ing a dubious assertion of congressional authority.  It would encour-
age the courts to use the common law method, working one case at a 
time, without needing to apply decision rules that measure whether 
Congress violated the Constitution in every instance where the statute 
operates.77  At the same time, the development of a robust as-applied 
Commerce Clause doctrine would discourage Congress from, as Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor warned in her Raich dissent, “nestling 
questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory 
schemes.”78  At the very minimum, recognition of the possibility of 
meritorious as-applied challenges will permit courts to use the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance to trim the constitutionally ques-
tionable boundaries of broad statutes such as the CWA, instead of 
 
 75 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the 
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369, 376. 
 76 Michael E. Rosman, Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause:  Rethinking Lopez and Morri-
son, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 29 (2012).  
 77 See Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court:  Deference, Facial Challenges, 
and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1753 (2006). 
 78 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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concluding—with the dissenters in SWANCC—that because the CWA 
is not invalid in whole, no such trimming should take place.79 
IV.  TWO MODEST AS-APPLIED COMMERCE CLAUSE DECISION RULES 
A final objection to the argument in defense of as-applied Com-
merce Clause adjudication is precedential:  after the Supreme Court 
decided Raich, most commentators concluded that as-applied Com-
merce Clause challenges were now foreclosed.80  Courts of appeals 
generally agree; as Professor David. L. Franklin has explained, “lower 
courts have reacted to Raich by declining to entertain as-applied chal-
lenges under the Commerce Clause.”81  Even the few courts of ap-
peals that had ruled in favor of challengers in as-applied Commerce 
Clause cases in the wake of Lopez and Morrison held that those prior 
cases were no longer good law after Raich.82 
This reaction rests on an overreading of Raich.  After all, Raich did 
not rebuff the as-applied Commerce Clause challenge categorically, 
as Rosenkranz believes it should have.83  Instead, the Court rejected 
the challenge only after reaching two conclusions necessary to its 
holding:  (1) the CSA regulated economic activity, including Ms. 
Raich’s cultivation and subsequent possession of marijuana84 and (2) 
it was rational for Congress to include homegrown marijuana, for 
private use, within the CSA’s prohibition because such marijuana is 
fungible with marijuana that is traded in the interstate drug market.85  
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court accepted the argument that as-
applied Commerce Clause challenges should become an important 
 
 79 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 
159, 192–97 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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merce Clause”); Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2006) 
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 81 David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. 
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Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1213–16 (11th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 83 Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1279. 
 84 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005). 
 85 Id. at 19, 22. 
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tool in trimming overreach by Congress, then Raich provides it with 
two ready-made decision rules to apply when dealing with assertions 
of authority under Lopez’s “substantially effects” prong. 
A.  The statute regulates both economic and non-economic activity, and the 
challengers’ action falls within the non-economic sphere. 
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court held that intrastate ac-
tivities at issue there could not be aggregated under Lopez’s “substan-
tially effects” prong.  Put another way, no matter the combined eco-
nomic impact of crimes outlawed by the statutes in Lopez and 
Morrison, the impact of those non-economic activities could not be 
aggregated to justify a statute under the Commerce Clause.  As the 
Court explained in Morrison, “While we need not adopt a categorical 
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in 
order to decide these cases, thus far . . . our cases have upheld Com-
merce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity 
is economic in nature.”86  From this principle, one can—at least argu-
ably—derive the rule that if a statute regulates both economic and 
non-economic activities, then the statute’s constitutionality can only 
turn on the aggregation of the economic activities; at the same time, 
the non-economic activities, which could not be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause and, thus, could not possibly provide the constitu-
tional justification, would remain outside of Congress’s reach.  Thus, 
if Congress passed a law that banned the possession of guns in school 
zones as part of a broader prohibition that encompassed economic 
activity, then Mr. Lopez would seem to have a strong argument that 
his mere possession of the gun in the school zone did not subject him 
to federal authority under the Commerce Clause.  In this way, Lopez 
and Morrison are not—as Justice O’Connor feared—”nothing more 
than a drafting guide.”87  As properly understood, Congress can draft 
no law, no matter how narrow or broad, which would go beyond reg-
ulating economic activity, at least under Lopez’s “substantial effects” 
prong. 
Nor does the Court’s holding in Raich extend Congress’s Com-
merce Clause authority beyond the regulation of intrastate economic 
activity which, taken in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce.  The Court in Raich did not hold that the nature 
of Ms. Raich’s activity was immaterial.  Instead, the Court adopted a 
broad definition of “[e]conomics” as meaning “the production, dis-
 
 86 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
 87 Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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tribution, and consumption of commodities” and then, held that Ms. 
Raich’s conduct fell within that definition.88  While this definition is 
broad, it is consistent with Lopez’s recitation of the Court’s prior hold-
ing as applying only to “economic activities,” including “intrastate 
coal mining,” “restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies,” 
“hotels catering to interstate guests,” and—most on point—
“consumption of homegrown wheat.”89  At the same time, this defini-
tion of “economic activity” is not unlimited.  Under Lopez, the mere 
possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity; un-
der Morrison, the commission of a violent crime that involves no ele-
ment of an economic motive is not an economic activity; and, under 
NFIB, refusing to enter into a market is not an economic activity.  
Other cases may well provide additional categories of non-economic 
activities, which Congress cannot regulate in order to forestall effects 
on interstate commerce.  Or, the Court may choose to narrow the 
range of what is an “economic activity,” especially when dealing in an 
area of historical state concern.  And, if a litigant can identify its activ-
ity as fitting within a subclass that is a noneconomic activity or no ac-
tivity at all, then that litigant should be able to prevail on an as-
applied Commerce Clause challenge, even if the rest of the statute’s 
regulation of economic activity remains undisturbed. 
B.  The statute sweeps in a substantial class of conduct that is too attenuated 
from the class of conduct that gives rise to substantial effects on interstate 
commerce. 
In Raich’s misunderstood passage, the Court explained that be-
cause the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate purely 
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” where “‘a general 
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is 
of no consequence.’”90  This statement, if properly understood, mere-
ly stands for the proposition that if a congressionally defined “class of 
activities” has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, then the 
fact that each individual instance of that activity does not itself have an 
 
 88 Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 54 at 
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 89 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining 
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effect on interstate commerce is of no moment.  At the same time, as 
Judge Higginbotham, explained even before Raich, 
[I]ndividual acts cannot be aggregated if their effects on commerce 
are causally independent of one another.  That is, if the effect on inter-
state commerce directly attributable to one instance of an activity does 
not depend in substantial part on how many other instances of the activi-
ty occur, there is an insufficient connection—in other words, an interac-
tive effect—and the effect of different instances cannot be added.  If, on 
the other hand, the occurrence of one instance of the activity makes it 
substantially more or less likely that other instances will occur, then there 
is an interactive effect and the effects of different instances can be add-
ed.91 
Under this understanding, Congress could rationally determine that 
legal permission for some citizens to grow and consume home-grown 
marijuana would impact “demand” for other marijuana in the inter-
state market, rendering irrelevant that any particular instance of 
home-grown marijuana did not have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.92 
Following from this understanding, Raich left open a decision rule 
permitting a party to argue that its activities—or subclass of activi-
ties—are not causally related to the economic activities that the stat-
ute regulates under Lopez’s substantial effects prong.  For example, if 
a statute regulated a class of economic activities that, taken in aggre-
gate, substantially affect interstate commerce, but also sweeps in an-
other class of activities with no causal relationship to the core class 
being regulated, then there would be no reason in logic or precedent 
to permit Congress to sweep in that second, unrelated class. 
Finally, even if the Court balks at either of the above described as-
applied decision rules in isolation, then at very minimum, they can be 
combined into one rule, which would prohibit Congress from using 
its Commerce Clause authority to regulate noneconomic activity that 
is too tangentially related to the core economic activity that the stat-
ute regulates.  Consider, for example, Section 1532 of the Endan-
gered Species Act (“ESA”).  The ESA prohibits anyone from “taking” 
endangered species, with “take” being defined as “pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, [and] capture.”93  It is at least arguable that 
the “taking” prohibition applies to economic activity—for example, 
“hunting” endangered species—whereas other taking activity—such 
 
 91 United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissent-
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 92 Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 22.  
 93 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1973). 
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as a “lone hiker”94 “killing” an endangered local gnat—would not be 
“economic.”  In addition, it is far from clear whether protection of 
particularly isolated species, which do not travel across state lines, 
have any interactive effect with the ESA’s broader regime.  And, while 
lower courts have thus far uniformly rejected as-applied challenges to 
the ESA, those courts have often disagreed within the same panel, 
and among themselves, as to the rationale for these decisions.95  This 
suggests an opportunity for a properly articulated as-applied Com-
merce Clause challenge to Section 9 of the ESA to—at minimum—
trim the application of the statute to clearly non-economic activities, 
similar to the Court’s decision in SWANCC.96 
CONCLUSION 
The two proposed as-applied decision rules above are modest in 
character and are unlikely—standing on their own—to achieve the 
Court’s goal of finding meaningful limitations on Congress’s Com-
merce Clause authority, while proceeding in a measured manner that 
does not disturb decades of settled expectations.  The important 
point is that as the Court continues in the task of crafting Commerce 
Clause decision rules, there is no basis to remove wholesale from its 
judicial toolbox the ability to create rules that permit litigation with a 
scalpel, not a meat cleaver.  There are cases where broader adjudica-
tion is appropriate, where such adjudication can more fully and duti-
fully enforce the Constitution.  But, that is not always the case. 
 
 94 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring). 
 95 See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting the panel’s justification of a similar 
regulation under the Commerce Clause for similar reasons); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Nor-
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 96 Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause:  A Reconsideration of the Scope of Federal 
Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 2032 (2008) (“[E]nvironmental regulations 
should be upheld as valid only when applied to actors such as businesses and real estate 
developers, who are engaged in economic activity.”). 
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While this Article has ostensibly been about as-applied decision 
rules, there is a deeper issue of constitutional adjudication at stake.  
The variety and complexity of laws, at both the federal and state lev-
els, has grown.  Those laws interact with the powers and limitations in 
the Constitution in complicated—often surprising—ways, especially 
when one takes into account the gloss added by two centuries of 
Court doctrine.  In such a complex world, it is highly unlikely that 
any judge or scholar would be able to design doctrines that always 
and only measure constitutional provisions in all of their applications, 
which also accurately reflect the meaning of constitutional provisions, 
under any theory of the Constitution. 
The deeper point is that the search for facial-only doctrines is not 
worth the candle, under any provision.  Nothing in Article III, the ju-
dicial power, or any constitutional provision requires courts to only 
measure the constitutionality of congressional actions in all of their 
applications, as opposed to taking a more flexible approach and de-
ciding that some actions, by some actors, violate the Constitution in 
the part relevant to the challenge being brought, leaving for another 
day—and, for the application of the venerable common law meth-
od—a wholesale challenge to Congress’s actions.  That is not to say 
that facial challenges should never be permissible, or should always 
be disfavored.  Far from it.  The point is that a per se rule under any 
constitutional provision requiring only facial invalidation or facial af-
firmance is unlikely to lead to real-world decisions by courts that 
comport with the Constitution. 
Does this mean that we should discard Professor Rosenkranz’s en-
tire project?  Not at all.  His critical insight that the subjects of the 
Constitution often explain which actor the constitutional provision is 
targeted at restraining or empowering provides powerful tools for 
understanding the substantive scope of those provisions.  Thus, for 
example, his understanding would seem to rule out any decision rule 
that measured the constitutionality of a statutory enactment under 
the Commerce Clause based upon how the President would choose, 
in his own discretion, to enforce that enactment.  That is because, as 
a textual matter, the President’s actions cannot inform the scope of 
congressional power.  Just because that insight does not also track di-
rectly upon disagreements that courts and scholars have had about 
when “facial” and “as-applied” challenges should be permissible does 
not make Professor Rosenkranz’s work any less valuable or any less 
worthy of study or understanding. 
 
 
 
